Deliberate release of biological agents s we enter the 21st century, the threats of biological warfare and bioterrorism (so called asymmetric threats) appear to be more real than ever and the events of the 11 September 2001 and the subsequent anthrax outbreaks have shown that the West needs to be prepared. The covert release of anthrax via five or six envelopes in the US mail resulted in 11 cases of inhalation anthrax (five deaths) and 11 cases of cutaneous anthrax (no deaths). The perpetrator(s) is/are still at large. Historical evidence suggests that biological weapons have been used on occasions since ancient times, but only in the last hundred years has scientific knowledge allowed them to be exploited predictably, with efficient means for their dispersal devised. Biological weapons can consist of bacteria, viruses, fungi or parasites, which lead to infection, or they can act as chemical poisons composed of bacterial, fungal or plant toxins. They are cheap, easy to produce and compared to chemical weapons, very toxic. If endemic organisms are used, attribution of an attack to any group or nation may be very difficult, and even a small number of casualties could cause mass panic. Consequently, biological weapons are of great interest to terrorists, whether they act in small groups or are state sponsored.
In theory, almost any organism could be used as the basis for a weapon, but the classic biological warfare (BW) agents remain the favourites because they are stable, easy to produce and survive dissemination. The lists published by WHO and others include the agents of anthrax, plague, tularaemia, smallpox and toxins such as botulinum. Currently, most concern in the public arena is focused on anthrax and smallpox. The categories of potential biological war agents, as described by the Centre for Disease Control, are shown in Table 1 .
Release could occur covertly (no warning), overtly (with a warning) or on the discovery of a suspect device or package (see Table 2 ). Prior to October 2001 experience of such inci-dences was limited. In 1984, 751 people became ill following the deliberate contamination of salad bars in ten restaurants in Oregon, with Salmonella typhimurium, by the Rajneeshee sect. Following the use of sarin by the Aum Shinrikyo sect on the Tokyo underground in 1995, subsequent investigations reveal they had already experimented with the use of Bacillus anthracis (albeit the avirulent Sterne vaccine strain), and Clostridium botulinum toxin.
Following a covert release the first indication of an incident will be the presentation of cases of unusual illness to the front line of a healthcare system. The systems of these first cases of unusual illness will often be indistinguishable from naturally occurring common diseases -a 'flu-like illness'. Alert physicians may recognise an unexpected pattern of presentation. It is essential that the laboratories supporting the front line healthcare responders have the potential to recognise the bioterrorism agents, provide initial identification and initiate without delay the backup public health and reference laboratories capabilities. Following a deliberate release there is small window of opportunity in which correct and early decisions will reduce the impact on the population.
A timely and definitive response to this threat will require cooperation between governments on a scale never seen before. There is a need for proper planning, good communication between various health, home office, defence and intelligence agencies and sufficient financial support for a realistic state of preparedness. The Department of Health has produced guidelines for responding to real or suspected incidents and the Health Protection Agency has produced detailed protocols to inform the actions required by microbiologists and consultants in communicable disease control.
The use of such agents presents new challenges for diagnosis and management of infectious disease as most staff are unfamiliar A Category Characterisation Agent
